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Introduction
The relevance of the informal sector (IS) debate to a
discussion of the special problems confronted by
women in the development process, lies in the fact
that both are concerned with groups subject to social
and political discrimination and forced into the labour
market equipped with relatively low levels of skill and
formal qualification. Like the developing economies
in the global context, both groups therefore bear an
inordinate share of the burden associated with capitalist
economies operating at less than full employment.
Analytically the most important characteristic dis-
tinguishing these two categories is the fact that women
clearly constitute a physically defined category of
labour made up of a particular set of individuals while
the informal sector refers not to a specific set of
individuals, but to that set of individuals whose labour
is not required by capitalists for direct wage employment.
In theory this means that while the problems of the
informal sector can only, by definition, be resolved
through full employment, those of women might be
resolved by an improvement in their relative position,
as a particular group of workers. In practice this
difference has important implications both for analysis
and for the formulation of appropriate policies or
political objectives.
The Informal Sector's Role in a Capitalist
Economy
The complex and often acrimonious debate over the
role played by the informal sector in developing
economies rests on a basic disagreement about the
prospects for capitalist full employment. In essence
there are three points of departure for the various
formulations held. The first considers global capitalist
full employment to be a realistic prospect in the
forseeable future; the second believes full employment
within particular capitalist nation states to be feasible;
the third sees capitalist full employment as a necessarily
partial and temporary condition which can neither be
sustained, nor generalised, and which ¡s a particularly
remote possibility in the underdeveloped countries.
In a formal sense, the feasibility of capitalist full
employment must plays a central role in determining
the way in which the informal sector is perceived, as
soon as the latter is defined as labour not yet directly
absorbed into capitalist production. However, the
connection between the level of employment and the
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position of wage labour in a capitalist economy is
worth considering ¡n more general and substantive
terms.
Full employment is a critical determinant of the social
consequences of competitive economic mechanisms.
In a competitive economy the wage is determined by
the supply and demand for labour, and when labour is
in excess supply the competitive process will tend to
force wages down. Furthermore, it will continue to do
so until arrested in one of three ways: by the
establishment of full employment; by reaching an
'efficiency wage level', (defined as that level of wages
beyond which, because of adverse effects on productivity,
further reductions will increase unit labour costs); or
by generating social and political forces which restrict
the competitive principle, and introduce so-called
'market imperfections'. With these exceptions, the
downward pressure on wages recognises no limits, nor
¡n the absence of full employment is this pressure
eased by the fact that technical progress may have
raised average productivity to historically high levels.
Such productivity increases do not by themselves
increase real wages, they merely accelerate accumu-
lation. Within the logic of the system real wages for
the labour force as a whole are increased only by the
emergence of a general scarcity of labour, though of
course high average productivity levels may help to
ensure the accumulation required to produce such a
labour constraint. On this aspect of the wage question
there is agreement between neo-classical and classical
(both Ricardian and Marxian) economics.
lt follows then that the relatively benign form of
capitalism associated with the industrial countries is
that of full employment capitalism. Such a capitalism
disperses material benefits to the mass of its population,
and accelerates technical progress by concentrating
the search for competitive advantage on technical
change. Furthermore, if capitalism could permanently
take this form in the developing countries it could be
expected to produce similar results there. The substantial
rise of unskilled real wages in South Korea in the
1970s, which occurred even though the weak trade
unions were controlled by an authoritarian, growth-
oriented state, provides the most recent evidence in
support of this argument.
Returning to the informal sector debate, it can now be
seen that for anyone who believes in the present
possibility of global capitalist full employment, and
who therefore also believes that existing market and
institutional structures are effective in channelling
and reinvesting profits, low wages are bound to appear
egalitarian and progressive, since they contribute to
accumulation, and bring closer the day when eveiyone
is incorporated into the capitalist structure. Indeed it
is only at that point that the diffusion of material
benefits can begin without undermining growth and
without discriminating against those sections of labour
still left outside the system.
The informal sector debate challenged this perspective
in the early 1970s, precisely because the explosive
urban growth in the developing world demonstrated
the existence of a large pool of labour which the
capitalist sector could not absorb in the foreseeable
future. One way of dealing with this problem was to
consider the 'informal sector' as a separate sphere of
activity which, rather like the non-capitalist subsistence
sector in the 'Lewis model' [Lewis 1954[, acted as a
labour reservoir releasing its labour to the expanding
capitalist sector as required, while through its income
opportunities, establishing a lower limit to the capitalist
sector's unskilled wage. Unfortunately, if it was a
'separate' sphere, its internal developments would not
be guided by market signals, so that their impact on
capitalist accumulation would be unpredictable and
generally problematic, especially because improvements
in the sector's productivity would impede accumulation
by raising wages. The identical problems presented by
the Lewis model's 'subsistence sector', had been shown
to be resolvable in theory, if that sector could be
transformed into a capitalist agricultural sector L Ranis
and Fei 19611. Naturally the informal sector debate
soon began to consider how this sector could be
similarly integrated into the overall process of capitalist
accumulation.
A theoretical solution to the problem was to hand
once one established that it was possible, and indeed
necessary, to consider the informal sector as an integral
part of the process of capitalist accumulation, since it
was almost certainly more freely competitive than the
rest of the economy, its products circulated within
open domestic markets, and its labour force moved
relatively freely within the domestic economy. 1f capital
did not move so freely this might simply reflect a
rational response to the high risks and low profit
margins associated with these forms of production.
This resolved all problems for the theoreticians, if not
for the people in the shanty towns. There was now no
massive unemployment, since the allegedly unemployed
labour was working in the informal sector. Furthermore,
the informal sector was no problem since in many
respects it made the best possible use of the labour
available lILO 19721. Furthermore, since it was so
closely integrated with the capitalist sector, its low
wages were just as much a regrettable but ultimately
desirable necessity, as were the low wages in the
capitalist sector, which, indeed, they helped to define
[Fitzgerald 19761.
When such analytic perspectives were combined with
a fervent desire to achieve rapid change, attention
turned to efforts to assist those in the informal sector
to become accumulating capitalists through training,
or credit or other forms of concrete assistance, and
although in some cases it was recognised that this
would inhibit accumulation by the existing owners of
capital LILO 1972[, there was generally too little
recognition of the macro-economic policies required
to make such an option feasible. This related especially
to the need to reconcile the capitalist sector's exposure
to international competitive pressures with the proposed
'national' policies, even if these were feasible in terms
of domestic political forces.
In general the resulting efforts were based on the
misconceived idea that the improvements sought could
be affected within the existing macro-economic frame,
and that the informal sector was constituted by the
particular individuals found within it at any one time,
whose condition one needed to improve [Sethuraman
1976 L. Not surprisingly, the consequent policies could
never escape the charge that they were merely helping
some individuals at the expense of others, or that they
were shifting resources towards less efficient uses, to
the detriment of the overall process of accumulation.
Indeed, within this frame of analysis, the charge of
resource misallocation could only be effectively rejected
if it could be shown that the proposed resource shifts
represented a removal of existing 'market imperfections',
reflecting political discrimination against the informal
sector(ILO 19721.
To conclude, given a belief in the efficacy of the
market, and in the reasonable prospect of global full
employment, the informal sector, viewed as an integral
part of the competitive economy, merely appears as a
particular, and indeed appropriate, form for capital to
utilise labour when that capital is very scarce in
relation to labour. The fact that such activities yield
low income either indicates the existence of market
imperfections, or reflects their low productivity. The
only real solution to that problem is therefore to
remove the imperfections and to assist the process of
accumulation by leaving incomes to be determined
strictly by the market. If in fact global competitive
pressures did drive wages - and through them informal
sector incomesdown below the level of subsistence.
then the resultant problem had to be seen primarily as
one of over-population.
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But the view of the informal sector changes dramatically
if global full employment is not seen as a realistic
possibility in the foreseeable future, either because it
is simply too remote, or because the global process of
accumulation is too imperfect or uneven for its general
realisation. Nor does it matter, at this stage in the
argument, whether this is true because of market
imperfections' involving the use of political and market
power to concentrate the process of accumulation in
certain locations (countries), or because the importance
of technical change as a means of reproducing
competitive advantages was so great that the competitive
process itself produced an increasing concentration of
capital. Probably in the real world both of these
mechanisms have been important, so that the logic of
the market and the effect of market imperfections'
have been mutually reinforcing.
From such a perspective low wages in the developing
countries appear as exploitative shackles binding workers
to a system which produces benefits for others, primarily
members of the bourgeoisie who derive their con-
sumption funds out of the accumulated surplus, but
also including other groups in protected' parts of the
global labour market. Hence those in the informal
sector, along with the weakest, lowest paid sections of
the labour force, appear trapped in a situation where
their sacrifices will not help to solve their problems.
All that is possible under these circumstances is for a
few individuals to escap& into capitalist accumulation,
or into some protected labour market through
emigration, the acquisition of some skill, or luck.
Now exhortations to work harder, or the justifications
of low wages as a necessary requirement for accumu-
lation and eventual full employment, appear as specious
arguments designed to justify a system whose material
benefits accrue primarily to those who control it. The
same is true of the benefits of improved efficiency,
which will also, at best, allow a few individuals to
escape, which may, however, be important since so
long as such escape is thought to be possible, the
intense competitive pressures within the informal sector
will limit the emergence of solidarity, in support of
more general solutions, especially since these will be
necessarily slow and uncertain.
But where does this second perspective lead, analytically
or politically? It is, after all, hardly adequate merely to
show why certain types of policies are unlikely to
resolve the problems at which they are directed. It is
necessary rather to pursue the argument to the point
where it helps to clarify the objectives worth arguing,
or struggling for. The result will depend on the extent
to which full employment nationally is seen as either a
feasible or a desirable objective. Both historically and
theoretically there are good reasons for considering
lo
this to be a genuine alternative, although given current
high levels of global unemployment, there is wide
disagreement over the mechanisms by which it might
be realised.
Within a capitalist context, such a possibility requires
policies designed to initiate a nationally concentrated
process of accumulation which makes use of domestic
and foreign resources to create a production structure
simultaneously capable of producing full employment,
maintaining its external accounts in balance and
developing a technological capacity capable of sustaining
competitiveness even when real wages begin to rise.
The rare cases of Japan, and of South Korea in the
1970s, suggest that this requires a powerful state
capable of imposing a long-term national rationality
on investment patterns, through nationally controlled
financial, industrial and trade structures, although
tiny economies like those of Hong Kong or Singapore
suggest that in their case such requirements are less
strict.
The nature and degree of state intervention required
to achieve such objectives at the present stage of
capitalism's global evolution cannot be further discussed
in the context of this brief paper. Suffice it to say that
the range of possibility extends all the way from the
South Korean to the North Korean models, and may
well conform to the principle that the more remote
capitalist full employment is thought to be, the more
extensive is the range of potentially beneficial forms
of state intervention. Indeed, if sustained permanent
full employment is not just seen as temporarily
unattainable, but is deemed impossible under capitalism,
then this provides the basis for a move away from
capitalism, and a removal of private capital as the
central actor in the process of accumulation and
resource allocation.
It is these underlying perspectives which account for
the extraordinary extent of disagreement in a debate
ostensibly concerned with the phenomenon of small-
scale production. While from all points of view the
encouragement and improved efficiency of small-
scale production is potentially of great significance, it
is on&s perception of the context withIn which such
efforts are undertaken, which will determine whether
they improve the welfare of the groups in question,
even if they do increase productivity.
Given these wide disagreements which are reflected
in the debate there is nevertheless a considerable
common ground for all those who consider that the
present impossibility of full employment in most
developing countries requires special policies aimed
at maximising aggregrate production while preventing
minimum wages from falling below some socially and
politically defined minimum. Since this cannot be
done by simply legislating minimum wages, it can only
be done by providing (if possible), the as yet unin-
corporated labour with productive assets, so as to
allow that labour power to be utilised optimally in a
self-employed context! Lipton 1980!. For such labour,
incomes would be determined by their average product.
rather than by their 'marginal product' in an over-
supplied labour market. The opposition to such policies
comes from the fact that they raise the minimum wage
in the capitalist sector and hence reduce the rate of
accumulation of the present owners of capital. Even
so this need not reduce overall accumulation in the
economy, since these self-employed producers would,
in the course of their operation. effectively create
capital which could more than offset the losses incurred
elsewhere. Such small producers could thus make a
net addition to capital accumulation, always provided
that the environment in which their growth had been
fostered was maintained, and their 'assets were not
destroyed by their sudden exposure to competition
from technically, or economically, much more powerful
rivals Bienefeld 1975 j. The problem is that while a
national policy protecting domestic capitalists from
international competition is sometimes a feasible
proposition, a similar policy, within a nation, to protect
petty producers from domestic capitalists is more
difficult to imagine, especially if these domestic capitalists
are themselves subject to competitive pressures from
abroad, through commodity, money or capital
markets.
Women in the Labour Market
For women in the labour market the problems are
similar, with two significant differences. First, since
they constitute a specific group, their problems could
in theoiy be resolved without even the attainment of
full employment at the national level. Secondly, they
suffer a degree of social oppression, which is super-
imposed on their difficulties in the labour market, and
which means that they are often the first to suffer from
unemployment, and even when there is full employment,
they may actually be prevented from enjoying its full
benefits.
It is this duality which gives women's struggles their
particular and complex character, so that they continue
when there is full employment, as in the industrialised
countries in the 1960s, and even when labour power is
no longer sold on the market, as in the socialist
countries. At the same time, there can be no doubt
that the economic context exerts a powerful influence
over the possibility and the nature of these struggles
and it is important to consider the complex relationships
between these two arenas.
In general these two sources of oppression may be
regarded as mutually reinforcing, with the social
oppression of women being strengthened by the
difficulties they encounter in obtaining employment
and by the poorer conditions they must endure when
they do find it. Thus the social and economic struggles
of women cannot be separated. It remains essential
that a primary objective must be the establishment of
a state, capable of generating a socially desirable and
dynamic process of accumulation which leads towards
eventual full employment, but which in the meantime
maintains a minimum wage floor, not through dis-
criminatory legislation, but by facilitating the de-
velopment of a dynamic small-scale production sector
based on a dispersal of productive assets and gradually
declining, though adequate, levels of protection.
Within such a context the overthrow of social oppression
would become easier. Indeed, if full employment were
eventually achieved, market forces would actually
come to support the fight against social oppression,
although this would by no means ensure its success.
That does not imply, however, that the economic
struggle should come first, to be followed by the social
struggle when the former has succeeded. Rather the
two must go hand in hand. In this sense the womens
struggle must identify itself with the efforts of all those
seeking to attack the problem of the informal sector.
or of marginalised labour, at its roots.
In so far as this common objective is abandoned, what
is left is the attempt to gain access to those jobs that
are available, on whatever terms are on offer, by
demanding equal access or by protecting some niche
of the labour market for a particular group. The fact
that such struggles may not produce general improve-
ments does not mean they are insignificant. To the
groups or individuals concerned they are most important,
so important indeed that they often obliterate any
concern with the broader issues, especially since the
proposed solutions to these broader questions are
complex, long-term, theoretical and disputed, while
the gains from narrower 'economistic' struggles appear
simple, concrete and clearly visible, even though they
are in reality necessarily restricted to a few aspirants.
Such struggles between different groups of workers
are welcomed and encouraged by capital as 'healthy'
competition in the labour market, and in them the
market again displays its egalitarian side. Far from
being in any direct sense a cause of women's social
oppression, it is rather a force whose inner logic fights
against that discrimination to make all equal before
the law of value. Left to exert its influence, it will fill
nineteenth century Manchester cotton mills, or twentieth
century runaway electronics factories, with women
(or children) even where women's access to jobs has
been severely restricted by established custom.
Unfortunately. so long as full employment remains
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unattainable, the result equalises working conditions
for everyone, bar the labour aristocracies', but it
equalises them by worsening them all.
A special problem arises if political struggle is able to
induce the state to force the process of accumulation
to operate alongside a small-scale productive sector
based on labour-intensive self-employment, able to
generate an average income which establishes a socially
and politically viable floor to the capitalist wage. If
within that 'informal sector', production is based for
instance on the principles governing labour allocation
in the subsistence rural household Chayariov 1966!,
or the so-called Family Mode of Production Lipton
1980 j, then within these economic units', labour is not
allocated according to marginalist principles applied
to each individual as in a labour market, but will be
more fully utilised in that it will be applied until
production is maximised [Sen 19661.
Now theoretically the economic unit' in question
need not be the household, or family. It could be a
commune, a collective or some other socially constituted
unit of joint production and consumption, but it cannot
be the individual. In so far as it is desirable that in
some sphere of production labour is utilised according
to such alternative principles, it is, therefore essential
to have viable economic units within which to apply
these. Unfortunately it is hypothetical social units
such as these which are the agencies of women's social
oppression, whether these be the family, or the commune
White 1980!. This means that in those developing
countries where even an ideally constituted process of
accumulation could not hope to attain full employment
in the foreseeable future, and where therefore such
alternative patterns of labour use are likely to be
desirable for accelerating accumulation and for providing
a floor to the market wage. a choice needs to be made.
If such an alternative is to be espoused, the need to
establish some relatively equitable social and economic
units on which it is to be based must be acknowledged.
Otherwise the alternative must be rejected on the
grounds that the degree of social oppression of women,
inevitably associated with such units, is unacceptable.
In that case there is. however, no way to devise an
accumulation model which could avoid imposing heavy
social and economic costs on the unskilled mass of the
labour force, during the time required to reach full
employment. Indeed this conclusion would also apply
to a socialist econmy incapable, in the short run, of
providing all its members with employment opportunities
based on the use of productive assets made available
within a planned economic structure.
For different reasons a similar issue arises if we look at
the labour market's logic in a full employment capitalist
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economy.' Here too competitive markets would tend
in principle to help the women's struggle break down
socially constituted discriminatory barriers. Furthermore,
in this case the consequence would be more desirable,
since it would tend towards an equalisation of the
conditions of labour, within a context of rising real
wages. Here too there would be a problem, however,
in that if this equality is achieved within a competitive
market context, it will be achieved within the context
of a further individualisation of society. In this sense it
is important to question the idea so widely derived
from Engels, that the bourgeois family is the necessary
foundation of bourgeois capitalist society. In fact the
advance of capitalism has involved the progressive
breaking down of effective social unitsfrom the
community or clan, to the extended family, to the
nuclear family. At the end of this process stands the
individual and the logic of the system will not rest until
each individual is fully and directly exposed to the
dictates of the market, until
by the action of Modern Industry, all family ties
among the pro/etarians are torn asundei and their
children tran.sfo,med into simple articles of commerce
and inst ruments of labour [Marx and Engels 18481.
Again, this is not a decisive argument, since women's
oppression within the family may, in general, be deemed
so intractable and pervasive, that such consequences
are accepted as a lesser evil, or welcomed as a liberation.
Even so it is important to recognise these implications
clearly, and to consider the possibility that there may
be an urgent need to combine the struggle for equality
in the market, with a struggle for the constitution of
some acceptable social unit, within which people
could be encouraged to make lasting commitments
and to build human relationships, protected from the
short-term utilitarian and commercial calculus that
otherwise threatens to drown all human and social
relationships in its icy waters.
If this is not possible, all social relations are likely to be
transformed into 'arm's length' transactions between
otherwise independent agents. All, that is. except
those transactions effected within the ever expanding
corporate units of production which are not arm's
length in the economists' jargon. but which are subject
to the same utilitarian calculus, only now applied even
more ruthlessly within the confines of a soulless and
authoritarian institutional structure. Already many
corporations are said to prefer divorced, or unattached
people. as executives, because they will put the
corporation first, on the grounds that they cannot
afford people who maintain conflicting commitments.
The possibility of sustaining full employment under capitalism is not
a subject for this discussion. although it clearly cannot he taken for
granted.
At the end of this process, each individual's identity
will be defined in relation to his or her career or job,
and that in turn will be defined by some corporate
institution, demanding total commitmenton pain of
expulsion from the corporate world and its material
rewards.
For every one of us, but especially for those trapped in
the hopeless labour markets of the developing world,
the question is whether it is possible to construct
viable social and political units which the market can
serve. If that is not possible, then the most outrageous
science fiction vision of the future may come true and
the individualisation of society will proceed until not
only our labour power, but our very bodies will become
commodities. It is well to remember that slavery was
destroyed by capitalism largely because it proved less
efficient than free labour, and there is reason to
believe that technology could change that outcome.
Already there are schools in the United States where
teenage children are given daily doses of drugs to
reduce their 'hyper-activity', and there are factories in
South Africa and in various export processing zones
where labourers live as individuals in closely controlled
and even guarded dormitories. Who but a 'presumptuous'
moralist, using (much derided) subjective and normative
judgments, would say it was wrong' to bring these two
concepts together, while increasing and diversifying
the drugs administered? Certainly objections would
be raised to such attempts, but if such forms of
production proved more efficient, and if others had
introduced them and were threatening jobs as a result,
who can believe that they would not be reluctantly
accepted, especially in view of the much acclaimed
'benefits to the consumer'?
Like the genie in the fairy tale, the competitive principle
has brought untold material wealth to many, but it will
transform those gifts into the means of our enslavement
if it cannot be made to serve some social purpose
defined by people.
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